Why ICBMs Are Trending in Pakistan: Facts vs Fears (2025)
Gist of the VOA article (US says Pakistan developing missiles that eventually could hit US)
- U.S. concerns: A senior White House official stated that Pakistan is developing long-range ballistic missiles potentially capable of reaching the United States.
- Strategic intent: Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer warned this trend could pose a future threat to U.S. security.
- Missile tech upgrade: Pakistan is reportedly testing larger rocket motors and sophisticated missile systems.
- Sanctions imposed: The U.S. has sanctioned Pakistan’s state-owned National Development Complex and other entities tied to missile development.
- Diplomatic strain: U.S. concerns have been raised directly with Pakistani officials, with little substantive response.
- Pakistan’s response: Islamabad dismisses the claims as “unfounded” and “irrational,” stating its missile program is solely defensive.
- Historical context: Pakistan’s current missile range (Shaheen-III) is capped at 2,750 km, but the U.S. fears a shift beyond this limit.
- Geopolitical backdrop: The situation reflects eroding U.S.–Pakistan ties, U.S.–India alignment, and Pakistan’s growing defense links with China.

Understanding Missile Types and Technologies
What Is a Missile?
A missile is a guided airborne weapon designed to deliver explosive payloads to a designated target with varying levels of range, speed, and precision. Modern missile systems are broadly categorized based on launch platforms, trajectory types, propulsion, range, and warhead capacity.
Types of Missiles by Trajectory and Purpose
| Missile Type | Description | Speed | Range | Example Systems |
| Ballistic Missile | Launched into sub-orbital space trajectory; descends on gravity | Hypersonic (Mach 5+) | 300–16,000+ km | Agni-V (India), RS-28 (Russia) |
| Cruise Missile | Flies at low altitude along earth’s surface; jet/ramjet powered | Subsonic–Supersonic | 500–3,000+ km | Tomahawk (USA), Babur (Pakistan) |
| Hypersonic Missile | Travels at speeds over Mach 5; maneuverable and fast | Mach 5–20 | 1,000–5,000+ km | Avangard (Russia), DF-ZF (China) |
| Anti-Ship Missile | Sea-targeted missile launched from land, sea, air, or submarine | Subsonic/Supersonic | 100–500+ km | Harpoon (USA), BrahMos (India/Russia) |
| Anti-Air Missile | Targeting aircraft or drones | Mach 2–4 | 10–200+ km | S-400 (Russia), Patriot (USA) |
| Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) | Ground-launched missile to intercept aircraft or missiles | Variable | 20–400+ km | Iron Dome (Israel), HQ-9 (China) |
Classification by Range
| Range Classification | Abbreviation | Distance | Examples |
| Very Short Range | VSRM | < 100 km | MANPADS, Stinger |
| Short-Range | SRBM | < 1,000 km | Hatf-1 (Pakistan), Iskander (Russia) |
| Medium-Range | MRBM | 1,000–3,000 km | Agni-II (India), DF-21 (China) |
| Intermediate-Range | IRBM | 3,000–5,500 km | Shaheen-III (Pakistan), Agni-IV |
| Intercontinental | ICBM | > 5,500 km | Minuteman III (USA), DF-41 (China) |
Key Technical Features
| Feature | Function |
| Propulsion | Solid or liquid fuel; determines speed, weight, and reliability |
| Guidance System | Inertial, satellite-based (GPS/GLONASS), or terrain contour matching |
| Warhead Type | Nuclear, high-explosive, submunition (cluster), EMP |
| Launch Platform | Fixed silo, road-mobile, ship, submarine, aircraft |
What Makes ICBMs Unique?
- Strategic Deterrence: Form the backbone of second-strike capability
- MIRVs: Carry multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads
- Submarine-Launched: More survivable, hard to detect
- Prompt Global Strike (PGS): ICBMs can hit any target in under 30 minutes
Global Missile Inventories by Country (2025)
United States Missile Arsenal
| Missile Type | Model | Range | Warhead Type | Notes |
| ICBM | Minuteman III | 13,000 km | Nuclear | Silo-based, MIRV capable |
| SLBM | Trident II D5 | 12,000 km | Nuclear | Deployed via Ohio-class submarines |
| Cruise | Tomahawk | 1,600 km | Conventional | Precision, subsonic |
| Hypersonic (Under Dev.) | AGM-183 ARRW | 1,000+ km | Conventional | Rapid global strike |
- Missile Defense: Patriot, THAAD, Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD – Alaska).
Russian Missile Arsenal
| Missile Type | Model | Range | Warhead Type | Notes |
| ICBM | RS-28 Sarmat | 18,000 km | Nuclear (MIRV) | Can carry hypersonic glide vehicles |
| ICBM | RS-24 Yars | 11,000 km | Nuclear | Mobile and silo-based |
| Cruise | Kalibr | 1,500–2,500 km | Conventional | Ship/land-launched |
| Hypersonic | Avangard | 13,000 km | Nuclear | Glide vehicle; deployed on ICBMs |
| Hypersonic | Kinzhal | 2,000 km | Nuclear/Conventional | Air-launched, MiG-31 platform |
- Missile Defense: S-300, S-400, S-500 (strategic-level).
China’s Missile Force
| Missile Type | Model | Range | Warhead Type | Notes |
| ICBM | DF-41 | 12,000–15,000 km | Nuclear (MIRV) | Road-mobile; most powerful in PLA |
| IRBM | DF-26 | 4,000 km | Nuclear/Conventional | Anti-ship variant available |
| MRBM | DF-21 | 1,750 km | Conventional | Anti-ship ballistic missile |
| SLBM | JL-3 | 10,000+ km | Nuclear | New submarine-deployed variant |
| Hypersonic | DF-ZF | ~2,000+ km | Nuclear/Conventional | Mounted on MRBMs |
- Missile Defense: HQ-9, HQ-22; limited anti-ballistic systems.
India’s Missile Arsenal
| Missile Type | Model | Range | Warhead Type | Notes |
| ICBM | Agni-V | 7,000–8,000 km | Nuclear | Road-mobile, MIRV capable |
| MRBM/IRBM | Agni-II/IV | 2,000–4,000 km | Nuclear | Can target all of Pakistan and parts of China |
| Cruise | Nirbhay | ~1,000 km | Conventional | Indigenous, long-delayed |
| Supersonic Cruise | BrahMos | 290–500 km | Conventional | India-Russia joint venture |
| Under Dev. | Agni-VI | 10,000–12,000 km | Nuclear (MIRV) | Unconfirmed deployment timeline |
- Missile Defense: BMD Phase I in place; Phase II (anti-ICBM) under development.
Pakistan’s Missile Capabilities
| Missile Type | Model | Range | Warhead Type | Notes |
| MRBM | Shaheen-III | 2,750 km | Nuclear | Reaches Indian islands & Israel (barely) |
| SRBM | Ghaznavi, Nasr | 290–700 km | Nuclear/Conventional | Tactical, battlefield role |
| MIRV-Capable | Ababeel | ~2,200 km | Nuclear | First MIRV test in South Asia |
| Cruise | Babur (I, II, III) | 700–900 km | Nuclear/Conventional | Submarine/ground/air-launched |
| Alleged ICBM | Not confirmed | N/A | N/A | U.S. reports suggest possible ICBM program under development (unverified) |
- Missile Defense: No indigenous ballistic missile shield as of 2025.

Israel’s Strategic Arsenal
| Missile Type | Model | Range | Warhead Type | Notes |
| ICBM (suspected) | Jericho III | 4,800–11,500 km | Nuclear | Road-mobile, highly classified |
| SRBM | Jericho I/II | <1,500 km | Nuclear | Now largely retired |
| Cruise | Popeye Turbo | 1,500 km+ | Nuclear/Conventional | Sea and submarine-launched |
| Defense | Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 3 | – | – | Multi-layered defense network |
Iran’s Missile Arsenal
| Missile Type | Model | Range | Warhead Type | Notes |
| MRBM | Shahab-3 | ~2,000 km | Conventional | Main strategic missile |
| IRBM | Khorramshahr-4 | 2,000+ km | Conventional | Heaviest payload |
| SRBM | Fateh-110 | 300 km | Conventional | Tactical operations |
| Cruise | Soumar | 2,000–2,500 km | Conventional | Air/ground variant |
| Hypersonic (Claimed) | Fattah | <1,400 km | Conventional | 2023-announced, capability disputed |
- Missile Defense: Relies on Russian-made systems; limited indigenous SAMs.
Comparative Summary Table (ICBM Nations)
| Country | ICBM Capability | MIRV? | SLBM? | Hypersonic? | Cruise Arsenal | BMD System? |
| USA | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ (ARRW) | ✅ (Tomahawk) | ✅ (GMD, THAAD) |
| Russia | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ (Avangard, Kinzhal) | ✅ (Kalibr) | ✅ (S-400/S-500) |
| China | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ (DF-ZF) | ✅ (CJ-10) | ⚠️ (Limited) |
| India | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ⚠️ (Under dev.) | ✅ (BrahMos, Nirbhay) | ⚠️ (Partial) |
| Pakistan | ❌ | ✅ (Ababeel) | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ (Babur series) | ❌ |
| Israel | ⚠️ (Suspected) | ⚠️ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ (Popeye) | ✅ (Iron Dome, Arrow) |
| North Korea | ✅ | ✅ (Claimed) | ❌ | ⚠️ (Hwasong-18) | ✅ | ❌ |
| Iran | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ⚠️ (Unconfirmed) | ✅ (Soumar) | ⚠️ (Russian aid) |
Missile Components, Capabilities & Future Technologies
Anatomy of a Missile: Core Components
| Component | Description | Example |
| Booster Stage | Initial propulsion system used during launch (solid/liquid fuel). | Agni-V: 3-stage solid booster |
| Warhead/Payload | Can be nuclear, conventional, chemical, biological, or EMP. | MIRV warheads (Agni-VI, DF-41) |
| Guidance System | Determines flight path; can be inertial, satellite-based (GPS/GLONASS), or terminal (radar/IR). | Trident-II uses stellar-inertial guidance |
| Propulsion | Determines range and velocity. Solid-fuel = rapid launch; liquid-fuel = longer prep but better control. | DF-5 (liquid), Minuteman III (solid) |
| Reentry Vehicle (RV) | Protects warhead during atmospheric reentry. Advanced RVs can evade radar or deploy decoys. | Maneuverable RVs (MaRVs) on DF-ZF |
Ballistic vs Cruise vs Hypersonic Missiles
| Type | Flight Path | Speed | Altitude | Detectability | Notable Example |
| Ballistic Missile | Sub-orbital arc | Mach 10–20 | 300–1,500 km | High (during boost phase) | Minuteman III |
| Cruise Missile | Terrain-following, horizontal | Subsonic–Supersonic | 50–100 m | Low | Tomahawk, Babur |
| Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) | Boost-glide in atmosphere | Mach 5–20 | 70–100 km | Very low | Avangard, DF-ZF |
| Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) | Air-breathing (scramjet) | Mach 5–10 | Low-altitude | Medium | Russia’s Zircon |
Types of Ballistic Missiles by Range
| Type | Range | Examples | Used By |
| SRBM (Short-Range) | < 1,000 km | Hatf-I, Iskander | Pakistan, Russia |
| MRBM (Medium-Range) | 1,000–3,000 km | Shaheen-II, Agni-II | India, Pakistan |
| IRBM (Intermediate-Range) | 3,000–5,500 km | Agni-IV, DF-17 | India, China |
| ICBM | > 5,500 km | Minuteman III, RS-28 Sarmat | US, Russia, China, India |
Modern Missile Technologies
MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles)
- Allow a single missile to strike multiple targets.
- Reduces cost per target and overloads missile defense systems.
- Countries with MIRVs: U.S., Russia, China, India (Agni-VI), possibly Pakistan (Ababeel).
B. MaRVs (Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles)
- Can change course during reentry to evade interception.
- Used in newer Russian and Chinese systems.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs)
- Launched by ICBMs or IRBMs, then glide at hypersonic speeds.
- Hard to track or intercept due to unpredictable trajectory.
- Russia (Avangard), China (DF-ZF), U.S. (under development).
Stealth Cruise Missiles
- Use terrain-hugging and radar-evading designs.
- Ideal for precision strikes (e.g., India’s Nirbhay, Pakistan’s Ra’ad).
Missile Defense Countermeasures
| Countermeasure | Function | Examples |
| Decoys | Simulate warheads to confuse interceptors | MIRV + dummy RVs |
| Chaff/Flares | Disrupt radar/IR sensors | Cruise missiles |
| Penetration Aids | Includes electronic jammers and MaRVs | DF-41, Sarmat |
| Low Radar Cross-Section (RCS) | Stealth coatings and shapes | Ra’ad, Tomahawk |
Missile Defense Systems Overview
| System | Type | Coverage | Countries |
| THAAD | Terminal-phase | 200 km | US, UAE, South Korea |
| Patriot PAC-3 | Medium-altitude | 100 km | US, Japan, Israel |
| S-400 | Multi-target tracking | 400 km | Russia, India |
| Arrow-3 | Exo-atmospheric ICBM defense | 2,000+ km | Israel, U.S. |
| GMD (Ground-based Midcourse Defense) | ICBM intercept | North America | U.S. (Alaska & California) |
Proliferation, Strategic Doctrines, Threat Scenarios & Arms Control
Global Missile Proliferation Trends
Missile technology is no longer the preserve of superpowers. Regional actors are acquiring or developing advanced missile systems, including nuclear-capable platforms, due to:
- Technological diffusion via black markets
- Strategic insecurity in conflict-prone regions
- Dual-use components accessible via commercial trade
- State and non-state alliances
| Region | Proliferating States | Focus |
| South Asia | India, Pakistan | Nuclear triad, MIRVs, IRBMs |
| Middle East | Iran, Israel | Regional deterrence, SLBMs |
| East Asia | North Korea, China | Long-range deterrence, HGVs |
| Europe | Russia | Hypersonic dominance |
| North America | U.S. | Modernization of strategic arsenal |
First Use vs. No First Use (NFU): Definitions
- No First Use (NFU):
A pledge by a nuclear-armed state not to use nuclear weapons first, but only in retaliation after a nuclear attack. - First Use (FU):
A doctrine where a country reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first, even in response to conventional (non-nuclear) aggression.
Countries and Their Nuclear Use Policies
| Country | Policy Type | Notes |
| China | No First Use | Maintains official NFU since 1964. Reaffirmed in 2022 white paper. |
| India | Declared NFU | NFU policy since 1998; recent debates suggest doctrinal flexibility. |
| Russia | First Use | Reserves right to use nukes if existence of state is threatened; even by conventional war. |
| United States | First Use | No formal NFU. Maintains strategic ambiguity; debated during Biden administration. |
| France | First Use | Strategic deterrence doctrine includes preemptive nuclear use if national interests at risk. |
| United Kingdom | First Use | Policy allows first use if deterrence is deemed necessary. |
| Israel | Ambiguous | Never officially confirmed nuclear capability; policy deliberately ambiguous. |
| North Korea | First Use | Threatened preemptive use; declared readiness to use nukes if regime survival at stake. |
| Pakistan | No NFU (i.e., First Use) | Does not subscribe to NFU; maintains First Use posture to deter India’s conventional superiority. |
| Iran | Non-nuclear state | Denies seeking nuclear weapons; not officially nuclear-armed. |
Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Policy:
Pakistan Maintains a First Use Policy.
Pakistan does not follow a No First Use policy. Instead, it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first, especially in response to a major conventional military threat from India.
- Doctrine of “Full Spectrum Deterrence”:
Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and National Command Authority promote a flexible, full-spectrum nuclear deterrence, including tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), aimed at countering India’s Cold Start Doctrine. - Rejection of India’s NFU Pledge:
Pakistan has consistently rejected India’s No First Use policy as “not credible,” citing ambiguity in India’s own stance. - Credible Statements from Pakistani Leadership:
- In 2002, then-President Pervez Musharraf said:
“Nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence. However, if our existence is threatened, we will use them.”
- In 2015, Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry said:
“Pakistan has not made any commitment for No First Use.”
- In 2019, Prime Minister Imran Khan reiterated that Pakistan’s nukes are for deterrence, not war; but did not endorse NFU.
- Tactical Nukes Emphasis:
The development of low-yield Nasr (Hatf-IX) missiles supports Pakistan’s early-use doctrine in case of an Indian incursion.

Summary of Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Policy
| Policy Type | First Use |
| Strategic Doctrine | Full-Spectrum Deterrence |
| Key Focus | India-centric deterrence |
| TNWs (Tactical Nukes) | Yes (e.g., NASR missile) |
| NFU Stance | Rejected NFU policy |
Missile Doctrine Comparison
| Country | First Use Policy | Deterrence Doctrine | Delivery Platforms | Unique Strategy |
| India | No First Use (NFU) | Credible Minimum Deterrence | Land, Sea, Air | MIRVs in Agni-VI |
| Pakistan | First Use | Full Spectrum Deterrence | Land-based | Tactical nukes, Ababeel (MIRV) |
| China | NFU | Assured Retaliation | Land-based, SLBMs | Road-mobile ICBMs |
| Russia | Ambiguous | Escalate to De-escalate | All three | Avangard HGV |
| USA | Flexible Use | Strategic Triad | Silo, Bomber, SLBM | GMD & LRDR system |
| Iran | Ambiguous (denies nuclear intent) | Deterrence & retaliation | Land-based, proxy use | Missile-based doctrine |
| Israel | Ambiguous | Deterrence through opacity | Land, submarine (unconfirmed) | “Samson Option” doctrine |
Strategic Threat Scenarios
India-Pakistan Escalation
- Trigger: Terror attack or border skirmish
- Risk: Pakistan uses tactical nukes → Indian full-spectrum retaliation (Agni-V)
- Outcome: Risk of global conflict due to nuclear escalation
Israel-Iran Confrontation
- Trigger: Iran nears nuclear breakout capability
- Risk: Israeli pre-emptive strikes → regional war involving Hezbollah, U.S. bases
- Missiles Used: Iran’s Shahab, Israel’s Jericho III, Iron Dome/Arrow-3 defenses
China-Taiwan Conflict
- Trigger: Taiwan independence declaration
- Risk: China launches DF-21D/DF-26 against U.S. Navy
- Response: U.S. uses THAAD/Patriot, counterstrikes
North Korea vs. USA/Japan/South Korea
- Trigger: Missile test over Japan or nuclear detonation
- Risk: Pre-emptive strike on Pyongyang
- NK Response: Hwasong-17 launched towards Guam or Alaska
Russia-NATO Standoff
- Trigger: Baltic confrontation or Ukraine expansion
- Risk: Use of Iskander missiles, Sarmat ICBMs (strategic threat to U.S. mainland)
- NATO Response: Deployment of Patriot, THAAD in Eastern Europe
Arms Control Treaties & Breakdown
| Treaty | Purpose | Status | Key Players |
| NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) | Prevent spread of nukes | Active, but strained | India, Pakistan, Israel non-signatories |
| MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) | Prevent tech transfer | India joined, China not member | 35 nations |
| INF Treaty | Ban intermediate-range missiles | Terminated (2019) | U.S. withdrew, Russia followed |
| START/NEW START | U.S.-Russia strategic arms reduction | In effect till 2026 | Under negotiation |
| Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) | Curb ballistic missile proliferation | Voluntary | 143 signatories (Pakistan, China absent) |
Rising Concerns:
- Lack of universal participation (e.g., China, Israel, Pakistan)
- Treaty collapses (INF, Open Skies)
- Modernization race → New Cold War
Missile and Nuclear Policy Recommendations
- Revive INF-like bilateral treaties involving U.S., Russia, and China.
- Expand MTCR and HCoC participation to include Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran.
- Implement regional missile control frameworks (e.g., South Asian Missile Test Notification Agreement).
- Increase transparency in missile inventories through third-party audits (e.g., via IAEA).
- Incorporate hypersonic weapons in new arms control treaties, given their destabilizing nature.
Final Summary: Complete Article Takeaways
- ICBMs are strategic, long-range missiles critical to nuclear deterrence.
- Pakistan lacks ICBMs, but U.S. fears about its intentions have caused alarm.
- India, China, and Israel already possess or are developing advanced ICBM systems.
- Missile types include ballistic, cruise, hypersonic, each with different ranges and technologies.
- Comparative missile doctrine shows varying postures from NFU (India, China) to tactical first use (Pakistan).
- Missile defense systems are becoming more advanced but may still be overwhelmed by MIRVs or HGVs.
- Regional conflicts involving missiles remain a key threat to global stability.
- Treaties are failing, and new global cooperation is necessary to manage escalation risks.
- Social media trends in Pakistan on ICBMs reflect deep anxieties post-India strikes and U.S. intelligence leaks.
- Strategic planning in 2025 must consider missile threat realism, defense readiness, and global diplomacy.







